Argumentasi Kebijakan

Analisis kebijakan
tidak berhenti pada penggunaan berbagai metode pengkajian untuk menghasilkan
dan mentransformasikan informasi. Meskipun produksi dan transformasi
informasi merupakan suatu hal yang esensial dalam analisis kebijakan,
yang tidak kalah pentingnya adalah penciptaan dan penilaian secara kritis
klaim pengetahuan yang didasarkan atas informasi tersebut. Klaim pengetahuan
yang dikembangkan sebagai kesimpulan dari argumen-argumen kebijakan,
mencerminkan alasan-alasan mengapa berbagai macam pelaku kebijakan tidak
sepakat terhadap suatu alternatif kebijakan.

Argumen-argumen
kebijakan, yang merupakan sarana untuk melakukan perdebatan mengenai
isu-isu kebijakan publik, mempunyai enam elemen/unsur, yaitu:



  1. Informasi yang
    relevan dengan kebijakan (I)

    Dihasilkan
    melalui penerapan berbagai metode merupakan bukti dari kerja analisis.
    Informasi tentang masalah-masalah kebijakan, masa depan kebijakan, aksi-aksi
    kebijakan, hasil kebijakan, dan kinerja kebijakan yang disajikan dalam
    berbagai bentuk. Informasi yang relevan dengan kebijakan merupakan titik
    tolak dari suatu argumen kebijakan.


  1. Klaim Kebijakan
    (C)

    Merupakan
    kesimpulan dari suatu argumen kebijakan. Klaim kebijakan merupakan konsekuensi
    logis dari informasi yang relevan bagi kebijakan. Jika klaim kebijakan
    mengikuti penyajian informasi klaim tersebu berbunyi “maka”.


  1. Pembenaran/Warrant
    (W)

    Merupakan
    suatu asumsi di dalam argumen kebijakan yang memungkinkan
    analis untuk berpindah dari informasi yang relevan dengan kebijakan ke
    klaim kebijakan. Pembenaran dapat mengandung berbagai macam asumsi otoritatif,
    intuitif, analisentris, kausal, pragmatis, dan kritik nilai. Peranan
    dari pembenaran adalah untuk membawa informasi yang relevan dengan kebijakan
    kepada klaim kebijakan tentang terjadinya ketidak-sepakatan atau konflik,
    dengan demikian memberi suatu alasan untuk menerima klaim.


  1. Dukungan/Backing
    (B)

    Dukungan
    (B) bagi pembenaran (W) terdiri dari asumsi-asumsi tambahan atau argumen-argumen
    yang dapat digunakan untuk mendukung pembenaran yang tidak diterima
    pada nilai yang tampak. Dukungan terhadap pembenaran dapat mengambil
    berbagai macam bentuk, yaitu hukum-hukum ilmiah, pertimbangan para pemegang
    otoritas keahlian, atau prinsip-prinsip moral dan etis. Dukungan terhadap
    pembenaran memungkinkan analisis bergerak ke belakang dan menyatakan
    asumsi-asumsi yang menyertainya.


  1. Bantahan/Rebuttal
    (R)

    Merupakan
    kesimpulan yang kedua, asumsi, atau argumen yang menyatakan kondisi
    di mana klaim asli tidak diterima, atau klaim asli hanya dapat diterima
    pada derajat penerimaan tertentu. Secara keseluruhan klaim kebijakan
    dan bantahan membentuk substansi isu-isu kebijakan, yaitu ketidak-sepakatan
    di antara segmen-segmen yang berbeda dalam masyarakat terhadap serangkaian
    alternatif tindakan pemerintah. Pertimbangan terhadap bantahan-bantahan
    membantu analis mengantisipasi tujuan-tujuan dan menyediakan perangkat
    sistematis untuk mengkritik salah satu klaim, asumsi dan argumennya.



  1. Kesimpulan/Qualifier
    (Q)

    Kesimpulan
    (Q) mengekspresikan derajat dimana analis yakin terhadap suatu klaim
    kebijakan. Dalam analisis kebijakan, pemberi sifat sering diekspresikan
    dalam bahasa probabilitas (seperti “Barangkali”, “Sangat mungkin”,
    “pada tingkat kepercayaan 0,01”). Ketika analis secara penuh yakin
    terhadap suatu klaim atau ketika kesimpulan sepenuhnya deterministik
    dan tidak mengandung kesalahan sama sekali, suatu kesimpulan tidak diperlukan.




Struktur argumen
kebijakan mengilustrasikan bagaimana para analis dapat menggunakan informasi
untuk merekomendasikan pemecahan bagi masalah-masalah kebijakan. Hubungan
di antara ke-enam elemen argumen kebijakan juga mendemonstrasikan di
dalam cara-cara yang berbeda, tergantung pada kerangka referensi, ideologi,
atau pandangan dari kelompok-kelompok yang berbeda. Argumen kebijakan
memungkinkan kita terus melangkah melampaui perolehan informasi dan
mentransformasikan informasi itu ke dalam kepercayaan tentang kebenaran
yang dapat diterima (pengetahuan). Dengan demikian, analis dapat menggunakan
kombinasi berbagai metode sehingga menjadi terbuka terhadap tantangan,
dapat melakukan kritik diri, dan mampu mengarah kepada penyelesaian
masalah-masalah, bukannya melakukan pembenaran terhadap alternatif-alternatif
kebijakan yang disukai.

Sumber:

William N.
Dunn, Pengantar Analisis Kebijakan Publik, terjemahan.

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The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath A Political Economy Perspective (Part 3 of 3)

Bert Hofman
and Kai Kaiser World Bank
1

Paper Presented
at the Conference: CAN DECENTRALIZATION HELP
REBUILD INDONESIA?


A Conference
Sponsored by the International Studies Program,
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies,
Georgia State University

May 1-3 2002

Atlanta,
Georgia

    3. Issues
    in the Intergovernmental Fiscal System

Indonesia’s
new intergovernmental fiscal system devolves on aggregate enough resources
to cover the devolved expenditure responsibilities. But the intergovernmental
fiscal system is as of yet far from ideal. The distribution of
resources and tasks has caused budgetary problems in some of the regions,
especially at the provincial level. The regions’ high dependence
on central transfers could undermine local accountability. Inadequate
provisions for local taxes risks inappropriate taxation and unhealthy
tax exporting. And finally, the system has few means for central
government to finance national priorities at the local level.

Law 25 of 1999
meant fundamental reforms of Indonesia’s intergovernmental fiscal
relations. The reforms strongly increased the regional government’s
share of government resources, moved the transfer system from one dominated
by earmarked grants to one largely relying on general grants supplemented
by revenue sharing, and—with the reforms introduced by law 34/2000—gave
broad taxing authorities to local government.

Before the
2001 decentralization, most resources were transferred from central
to regional governments through earmarked grants. The largest
of these was the SDO (Subsidi Daerah Autonom or subsidy for autonomous
region) grant which covered all civil service salaries and recurrent
expenditures for the regions. In addition, INPRES (Instruksi President)
grants aimed to finance development spending in the regions. The
INPRES grants started as a block grant for development spending in the
1980s, but gradually evolved into an array of specific grants for purposes
ranging from re-greening18

In the new
system, central regional transfers remain the dominant means of financing,
but the earmarking is gone. The bulk of regional government spending
is financed by transfers from the center (see Table 1:DAU Dominates).
Well over 90 percent of regional revenues come from the Balancing Fund
(dana perimbangan) which includes a general grant (the Dana Alokasi
Umum or DAU), shared taxes, natural resource revenues (SDA, sumber daya
alam), and a special allocation grant channel (DAK, dana alokasi khusus)
Local governments have limited own revenues (PAD, pendapatan asli daerah),
which constitutes less than 7 percent of total revenues. Starting
2002, the center is also making additional special autonomy transfer
arrangements with two provinces.




Dana Alokasi
Umum. The Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU) or general grant is the mainstay of
the new intergovernmental fiscal system. The DAU adds up to some
65 percent of regional revenues, and to a little over 70 percent of
the Balancing Fund. The DAU is by law a minimum of 25 percent
of central government revenues after tax sharing.19
For 2001 and 2002 this minimum allocation has been maintained by Government
and Parliament. However, although the law and the regulations
suggest that the 25 percent is the share of actual revenues after revenue
sharing, for FY2001 the budgeted amount was disbursed. In
all, this cost the region some Rp. 9 Trillion in revenues, or 15 percent
of the total DAU for that year.20

Because the
“hold harmless” element was interpreted to be a minimum DAU allocation
rather than a guaranteed amount, this element took almost 80 percent
of the total DAU. In 2002, the minimum DAU was reduced to 50 percent
of the total amount, but rather than relating it to past SDO and INPRES,
is became a minimum amount per region, plus an amount related to the
actual wage bill of 2001. But “hold harmless” obtained a new meaning:
Parliament objected against the proposed distribution of the DAU, because
the richer regions stood to lose compared to the 2001 distribution.21


The formula
part of the allocation relies on the notion of expenditure needs and
own fiscal capacity. The share in the DAU pool for a region depends
on the difference between its fiscal needs and its fiscal capacity.
For 2001 there concepts were interpreted different from 2002, in part
due to practical reasons, in part due to more analysis done for 2002.
In 2001, at the time the formula had to be presented to the Regional
Autonomy Advisory Council, the data on shared revenues were not yet
available, and it was decided to ignore them. For 2002 they were included,
but natural resource revenue shares only for 75 percent. As indicators
for expenditure need the formula includes (i) population; (ii) poverty
rate; (iii) land area; and(iv) the construction price index as an indicator
of “geographical circumstances.” The formula must include these
variables, as they arementioned in the elucidation of Law 25/99.
In the 2001 formula each of the variables was included with equal weight,
whereas in the 2002 formula, population and area both received higher
weights than the others.

Contingency.
The DAU allocation was supplemented by a “contingency fund” to absorb
any mismatches between devolved expenditure responsibilities and revenues.
Of a budgeted amount of Rp. 6T. in 2001, some Rp. 3 T was disbursed.
The first tranche of Rp. 1.1 T. related to genuine mismatches caused
by decentralization. A process of application, review and allocation
set out in a Presidential decree was followed for this tranche.
The second tranche, however, became necessary because of the centrally
mandated salary increase which pushed up the regional wage bill by some
15-30 percent.

Shared revenues.
The 2001 decentralization greatly increased the importance of shared
revenues. The most important factor was the inclusion of oil and
gas revenues and personal income tax in the taxes to be shared.
The former were included to accommodate long-standing dissatisfaction
of natural resource rich regions which felt that “Jakarta” took
their resources, and they did not get anything in return. True
or not, with the implementation of Law 25/1999, they now get a significant
share of those revenues (see Table 2: Revenue shares). In addition,
the personal income tax was included for sharing through Law 17 of 2000.22
For each of these shared taxes, the province gets a minor part, whereas
the bulk of revenues goes to the local governments.




The sharing
formulae for most of the shared revenues contain an additional element
of equalization. For oil and gas, mining, and forestry, the local
governments of regions neighboring the producing region receive a share
as well. For fisheries, property tax and land transfer tax, a
small percentage of the revenues is shared by all local governments
in Indonesia. Whereas the underlying motivation may well be one
of equalization, with the initiation of a formula-based DAU, these complex
sharing mechanisms may well be redundant—whatever a region gets from
those shared taxes is counted as own fiscal capacity, and reduces the
allocation of the DAU.

Own Revenues.
Law 34/2000 greatly expands the scope for local government revenues.
The law amended law 18 of 1997, which intended to stop the then-prevailing
local government practice of issuing a plethora of local government
taxes, many with little revenue potential, and high costs to the taxpayer
and the economy. Law 18/1999 therefore restricted regional taxes
to a closed list, and made any additional taxes conditional upon approval
of the Ministry of Finance.

Law 34 reverses
the burden of proof. The law still gives a list of regional taxes,
but regional governments can add taxes through regional regulations
approved by the regional government council, as long as it abides by
the principles mentioned in the law. These principles are sound
(Box), but supervising them has turned out to be problematic—not least
because the law has tight deadlines for central government to meet if
it wants to cancel a local tax. An added complication is the way
supervision is structured: Law 22/1999 gives the Minister of Home Affairs
the authority to cancel regional regulations, including those on regional
taxes. Up until now, the Minister has been hesitant to invoke
these powers, not least because regional governments have the right
to appeal his decision to the Supreme Court. As a result, there
has been little to check regional government’s creativity in taxation,
and although the damage still remains limited, 84 out of the more than
1,000 regulations on local taxes have been found to be in conflict with
the law. Among them are taxes on the “import” of goats into
kabupaten Bogor, and an advertisement tax on Coca-Cola bottles in Lampung
province. Meanwhile, the Minister of Home Affairs has as of now formally
cancelled only one regional tax.

Do the Regions
Get Enough?

A key question
for the new intergovernmental fiscal system is whether the regions on
aggregate receive enough resources. This question can be
considered in three ways: (i) do the regions receive enough resources
to cover the expenditures needed for the tasks they are expected to
perform? (ii) do the regions receive an amount compatible with what
government as a whole can afford? and (iii) do the regions receive enough
to cover the spending obligations they inherited from the central government
in the course of decentralization.

Method (i),
sometimes labeled the costed minimum standards approach, has practical
and theoretical issues. For starters, as was argued previously,
Law 22/1999 does not clearly define the functions of the regional governments,
as the functions are defined negatively: local government does everything
that the center and the provinces does not do. And for the obligatory
functions of local government, which are defined in the law, it does
not clearly define what part of the function local government performs,
not what minimum standards of services should be delivered. Even
if these issues could be overcome, the in formation to cost out the
functions is lacking at present. Moreover, determining what the
functions cost at present may not be very telling for what the functions
should cost if efficiently delivered. But apart from all these
practical objections, there is a more fundamental objection against
this method: unless carefully managed, minimum standards are but a wish
list of spending developed independently of what government as a whole
can afford.

Method (ii)
the affordability approach faces several issues as well.
The method requires the Indonesian government to make choices for the
nation as a whole as to what it wants to spend its scarce resources
on. If the priorities so determined are tasks of regional government,
then more resources would need to be devolved—be it through grants,
revenue sharing, or devolution of more tax bases to regional governments.23
Although the method is to be preferred over the costed minimum standard,
there are numerous practical impediments, not least the lack of information
in the current budget and accounting system which does not allow a link
between policy goals and spending.


Central government
could devolve more resources if it wanted to do so. Currently,
a significant part of its spending is devoted to tasks that could be
considered local government tasks. Taking the 2002 budget as a
guide, the development budget still contains as much as 10-20 trillion
or \[1 percent] of GDP in spending which could be further devolved to
the regions, together with a corresponding increase in revenues.
Note that implementation of these projects is already largely done at
the sub-national level. However, since the financing is done from
the central budget, there is no local scrutiny over the spending.
On the recurrent budget, the wage bill probably offers further scope
for savings, as not all civil servants that ought to have been decentralized
actually were. Moreover, the Government has already decided to
phase out the fuel subsidies over time, and this will further free up
resources that could be made available to the regions. And finally,
the government is determined to increase the tax ratio to GDP over time.
One quarter of that increase will already be automatically transferred
to the regions through the DAU, but more could be made available to
the regions.

Whether increased
resources should be made available remains to be seen. First,
several areas of central government’s own responsibility that have
been chronically underfunded, most notably Operations and Maintenance.
Second, the central government is aiming for a zero budget deficit by
fiscal year 04, and achieving this goal is likely to absorb much of
the savings and additional revenues mobilize. And third, local
governments may not be ready to absorb additional spending at this time,
as they have just almost doubled their levels of spending, and their
local planning, budgeting and financial management systems may already
be stretched, and accountability at the local level is still weak.

(iii) Do the
devolved resources cover the devolved responsibilities? On aggregate,
more than enough revenues seem to have been devolved to match the transferred
revenue responsibilities. This holds even if we take account of
the July 2001 wage increase, and correcting the region’s own development
spending for inflation. In total, the regions received “surplus”
revenues of some Rp.21 Tr. in 2001, or 1.5 percentage point of GDP (Figure
3.__: More than enough).24




One could,
therefore, argue that decentralization “cost” the center this very
same amount: if Government could have perfectly targeted the devolved
resources, it could have transferred Rp. 21 Trillion less than it actually
did. Lewis (2001, p.330) estimates an even higher surplus of Rp.27.5,
but this was before the wage increase and the subsequent disbursement
of the contingency fund. Lewis also estimates separately the surpluses
of the provincial level and the local level. His judgment is that
whereas at the provincial level the extra revenues more or less just
cover the extra expenditures, local governments received most of the
surplus. This findings jives also with the disbursements from
the contingency fund, of which a disproportional amount was disbursed
to the provinces.

Further evidence
for the finding that more than enough resources were transferred can
be found in development spending. Budgeted regional development
spending made a significant jump in 2001, from an (annualized) Rp. 14
Tr. in FY2000 to a planned Rp. 26 Tr. in FY2001 (Table 3: Consolidated
Development Spending).

The regions
may have been forced to cut back slightly on these plans after the July
wage increase, but there is every reason to believe that development
spending in the regions rose significantly. This is good news
for government development spending as a whole: because of the increase
in regional development spending, the drop of central development spending
as a percent of GDP did not lead to a n overall decline: for both 2000
and 2001, this was budgeted to be about 5.1 percent of GDP.

Thus, the regions
as a whole do not seem strapped for funds. The increase in development
spending in the regions also suggests that there is more than sufficient
funds to cover the (recurrent cost of) functions transferred.
Therefore, the often-heard argument that the regions spend mostly on
“bureaucrats” and have too few resources for “services to the
people,” therefore seems to be a red herring. In fact, on aggregate,
wages make up little over 50 percent of regional spending (Table 4:
Summary Regional Expenditures). Moreover, it is a misconception
that only development spending can be considered as service delivery:
as the civil service numbers in chapter 2 suggest, some 70 percent of
the wage bill is paid to teachers and health workers, civil servants
that provide direct services to the people.




In conclusion,
on aggregate more than sufficient revenues were devolved to cover the
additional expenditure responsibilities of the regions. Little
can be said about whether this was enough to cover expenditure levels
sufficiently large to cover some minimum standard of services in the
regions.

How equal
is the new intergovernmental fiscal system?

Sufficient
resources for the regions on aggregate disguise large variations among
the regions in fiscal capacity. Even after redistribution through
the DAU, in FY2001 the richest local government had more than fifty
times as much revenues per capita as the poorest one (Table A.2).
The poorest region has only 20 percent of the per capita revenues as
the average. And the variation among the regions as measured by
the Gini coefficient for the per capita revenues for the regions is
some 0.39.

Some of this
variation can be explained by the small size of the units of local government
in Indonesia.25




But even if
one aggregates revenues at the provincial level, the variation in revenue
capacity remains large: the richest province has about ten times
as much revenues per capita as the poorest one, and the poorest one
has only some 40 percent of the revenue capacity of the average one.
For comparison, in the US, the poorest state as about 65 percent of
the revenues of the average state, and in Germany, any state falling
below 95 percent of average gets subsidized. In Russia, the variation
in the \[56] oblasts is more in line with that of Indonesia: the richest
of the 89 regions has revenues per capita some 40 times higher than
the poorest, which is still considerably less than that among Indonesian
local governments, although larger than among the provinces.26
In Brazil, the richest state has 2.3 times the revenues per capita of
the poorest state.27 In China, expenditures per capita
in the richest province was some 17 times that of the poorest one, but
excluding the city provinces of Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin, the
disparity fell to 5.5 to 1.28




Why are inequalities
in fiscal capacity so high among Indonesia’s regions? After
all, the Law on Fiscal Balance promises a system that would equalize
fiscal capacity among the regions taking into account the regions’
own fiscal capacity and fiscal needs. Two causes of inequality
stand out: (i) The large variation in own fiscal capacity among Indonesia’s
regions, and (ii) the imperfections in the equalization mechanism of
the DAU.

Disparities
in own fiscal capacity.

Own fiscal
capacity among the regions varies widely. Much of the variation
is due to revenues from natural resource sharing. The few regions
that do receive substantial amount, but not all. The distribution
of the personal income tax share is highly unequal as well, with some
regions receiving no revenues at all from this source. Relative
to these two sources of revenues, variation in own taxes (PAD) per capita
is relatively small.




Equalizing
properties of the DAU
29

The DAU allocations
reduce disparities in fiscal capacity among the regions. Whether
it does so by enough is hard to tell, in part because the concept of
equalization itself is left vague in the law, the regulations, and even
in the political debate surrounding the DAU allocation. Law 25/1999
requires the DAU to be allocated such that it reduces the disparity
between expenditure needs and “economic potential.” The allocation
is to be done by formula taking objective factors of needs into account
and own fiscal capacity. The elucidation of the law mentions explicitly
the factors population, area, poverty, and geographical condition—which
was later interpreted as cost differences. There are several reasons
for this, but the key one was that the allocation of the DAU was restricted
by the need to give regions enough finance to pay for the devolved government
apparatus, and the resulting “hold harmless” clause was misinterpreted.

The hold harmless
clause. In the run-up to 2001, the authorities had to solve the
intractable issue of matching the new expenditure assignments with the
new intergovernmental fiscal system. Expenditures “landed”
in those regions where the government apparatus that was to be decentralized
was located. To avoid that the bulk of the money, the DAU, would
land somewhere else, and thereby risking that civil servants went unpaid
and services break down, it was decided that the DAU allocation should
hold regions harmless compared to what they received before in SDO and
INPRES and what they had to spend extra on the devolved government apparatus.
This became known as the “base amount,” equal to 130 percent of
SDO and 110 percent of INPRES of (annualized) FY2000 amount. A
true hold harmless clause would have ensured that regions would not
fall below that amount. Instead, it became a minimum—absorbing
some 80 percent of the total DAU.

The DAU allocation
for 2001 therefore became strongly correlated with past distribution
of grants. This favored the resource rich regions, because the
old INPRES system was implicitly compensating these regions for the
revenues generated by them. On top of the base amount, each region
received an amount based on a formula that included fiscal needs and
own fiscal capacity. But because information on revenue sharing
was not yet known at the time of formulating the DAU, natural
resource revenue shares were not counted as own fiscal capacity.

The “hold
harmless” took on a different meaning in 2002. MOF had proposed a
more equalizing DAU allocation for 2002—among others by now taking
natural resource revenues into account, and the Regional Autonomy Advisory
Board had approved the proposal. But the regions that stood to lose
lobbied hard with Parliament, and even though according to Law 25/99
Parliament had no formal say in the distribution of the DAU (as opposed
to the aggregate amount), it insisted that each region would get at
least as much as DAU as in 2001.

The bottom
line of all this is that the DAU allocations are less equalizing than
one would expect based on the Law. Regression analysis in Hofman, Kajatmiko,
Kaiser (partially reproduced in Annex 3) shows that the DAU is positively
correlated with own fiscal capacity, and shows a strong relationship
with the wage bill. Nevertheless, the DAU still equalizes in the
sense that variation in revenue per capita as measured by Gini coefficient
or coefficient of variation is reduced by the DAU (Table 5). The
reason for this is that regions with high own fiscal capacity do receive
less DAU as a proportion of that own fiscal capacity even though in
absolute amounts they may receive more that regions with low own fiscal
capacity.




Fiscal Dependency

Historically
Indonesia has had one of the most centralized tax systems in the world
(Ma, Jun 1997). The recent fiscal decentralization actually increased
regional fiscal dependence, as measures by the share of own revenues
(PAD) in total revenues.International evidence suggests that this high
degree of dependence is inversely associated with governance outcomes
(de Melo, Luiz and Matias Barenstrein 2001), and fiscal dependence should
therefore be a concern for Indonesia.

Law 34/200
on regional taxes should have addressed the issue of fiscal dependency.
However, the approach taken in that law led to another set of problems.
Law 34/2000 allows for regions to issue their own tax regulations, as
long as they abide by certain (sound) principles. This is far
more liberal than Law 18/1997 which only allowed a limited number of
taxes specified in the law, with high hurdles on additional taxes. At
the same time, Law 34/2000 did not devolve a tax most suited for regional
governments: the land and real estate tax.30 Arguably the
approach of Law 18/1997 may be better, even though it did perhaps not
encompass an appropriate tax base for the regions “Nuisance” or
“predatory” taxation have received some attention during the first
year of decentralization. Many of those taxes are technically illegal,
and improved central supervision is clearly one important remedy to
this problem,. But a more fundamental solution to the “revenue
hunger” of the regions will probably include enhanced local tax bases
and marginal levels of revenue discretion. The trouble with this
solution is that those taxes that may be most lucrative from a revenue
basis, are also be less desirable from an equalization of fiscal capacity
perspective (e.g., natural-resources or property/service based taxes
which will disproportionately benefit urban areas).31

Directions
for Reforms


Indonesia’s
intergovernmental fiscal system can be much improved. The broad
orientation of reforms is to have the relatively rich regions “fend
for themselves” with own tax base, shared taxes and commercial borrowing.
The poorer regions are to get support through DAU, DAK, and access to
well-managed central lending and on-lending facilities to enable them
to provide similar quality services at similar local tax rates throughout
Indonesia.

Improving the
intergovernmental fiscal system in this direction requires, among others:


  • Moving to a more
    equalizing DAU by phasing out the transitional elements in the allocation.

  • Restricting local
    taxes to a closed list over which the regions have tax rate autonomy—possibly
    within centrally set limits.

  • This list of taxes
    should include the property taxes, and could include a local surcharge
    in the personal income tax and payroll taxes and selective business
    taxes. Expanding motor vehicle use or fuel taxation is a further
    option.

  • Deciding on a transparent
    and consistent treatment of natural resource revenues in revenue sharing
    and in the equalization formula.


  • Introducing a selective
    system of specific grants—combined with an (on) lending window—to
    promote the financing of national priorities at local level. A
    larger DAK could be financed from a gradual reduction in the center’s
    own development spending on regional functions.








References


1
The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper
are entirely those of the authors. They do not represent the views of
the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
This paper draws on the forthcoming World Bank Regional Public Expenditure
Review for Indonesia, and on Hofman, Kaiser and Kajatmiko (2001). The
authors wish to express thanks to Jorge Martinez, Roy Bahl, Richard
Bird, Roy Kelly, Dana Weist, Blane Lewis, Bernd May, and Machfud Sidik
for the many helpful discussions on the topic of the paper. We thank
Fitria Fitriani for excellent research assistance.

18
See Annex Table XXX for detail, and Silver, Christopher, Iwan J. Azis,
and Larry Schroeder. 2001. Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralization
in Indonesia. Bulletin for Indonesian Economic Studies 37 (3):345-62

19
Law 25 is not specific on whether the 25 percent is before or after
revenue sharing. PP104 has taken this interpretation, which has apparently
been accepted by Parliament and the regions.

20
Revenues in the approved budget for 2001 were Rp.263T and revenue sharing
Rp. 20 T, which yields a DAU of Rp. 60T. Actual revenues as per
preliminary outcome data suggests revenues of Rp. 299T. Assuming
the same amount of revenue sharing, this would result in a DAU of Rp.
69T

21

This Parliamentary involvement in the distribution seems against Law
25/1999 which specifies that the Regional Autonomy Advisory Council
proposes the distribution of the DAU to the President, who approves
it by Presidential decree.

22
The sharing of the personal income tax on a derivation basis was decided
at the last moment, and inspired by a conversation the Minister ff Finance
had on a trip to disseminate the decentralization laws. Art .31C
of Law 17/2000 describes the sharing. However, the article is unclear
whether the sharing of the personal income tax is based on the residence
principle or the place of work.

23
South Africa is operating such a system. The constitution prescribes
functions for the provinces and municipalities, and orders the government
to give each level of government its “equitable share” of the national
revenues. The equitable share is determined in the context of
budget preparation, which in the case of South Africa is ased on a medium
term expenditure framework. If, say, more priority is put on health
case, the equitable share of the province—which is responsible for
it, will; get a larger share.

24
One caveat here is the assumption that all development projects implemented
by the Kanvils and Kandeps continue to be financed from the central
budget. This seems to have been the case but the center is now
trying to find ways do devolve this financing responsibility.

25

This point was made by Richard Bird in a comment at the Bali conference
on Decentralization in East Asia, January 10-11 2002.

26
Martinez-Vazquaesz, Jorge and Jameson Boex (1998): Fiscal Decentralization
in the Russian Federation: Main Trends and Issues. Report prepared
for the World Bank/EDI, December.

27
Issues in Brazilian Federalism, Draft World Bank Report, May 8, 2001

28
World Bank, 2001 China: Provincial Expenditures Review, Report No. 22591-CHA),
November, Washington DC.

29
For more detail on this issue see Lewis (2001) and Hofman, Kajatmiko,
and Kaiser (2002)


30
The thinking in the ministry of Finance on this has already shifted
in the direction of devolvingthis tax.

31
Zhuravskaya (2000) argues that the intergovernmental fiscal system prevailing
in the Russian federation in the ninetees provided no incentives to
increase the local tax base or provide public goods. Shared revenue
allocations effectively penalized regions that raised their own revenues.
When regions effectively have no opportunity to increase local revenues,
they will also have little incentives to increase the local tax base
and will over-regulate local business.

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Pengertian dan Perkembangan Analisis Kebijakan

Analisis kebijakan
dapat dimengerti sebagai proses yang menghasilkan pengetahuan
tentang
dan dalam proses kebijakan. Pengetahuan

tentang
proses kebijakan mengacu pada “studi sistematis dan
empiris tentang bagaimana kebijakan dibuat dan memberikan efek”, sementara
pengetahuan dalam proses kebijakan mengacu pada pemahaman
bahwa “realisme keputusan untuk sebagian bergantung pada akses terhadap
stok pengetahuan yang ada”. Dalam definisi yang luas ini, analisis
kebijakan mencakup berbagai bentuk pengkajian, dari penggunaan mistis
atau tenaga gaib sampai ke ilmu-ilmu modern.

Secara historis,
tujuan analisis kebijakan adalah menyediakan informasi bagi pembuat
kebijakan untuk dijadikan bahan pertimbangan yang nalar guna menemukan
pemecahan masalah kebijakan. Dengan demikian, analisis kebijakan memiliki
dasar orientasi praktis yang dalam banyak hal menjadikannya sama dengan
ilmu sosial terapan.

Metodologi,
metode dan teknik analisis kebijakan telah berubah dengan nyata sepanjang
sejarah. Tetapi analisis kebijakan secara eksplisit hanya menjadi empiris
dan kuantitatif pada periode setelah Revolusi Industri. Ketika analisis
kebijakan abad dua puluh mengikuti tradisi yang telah ditetapkan pada
abad sebelumnya, lima puluh tahun yang lalu telah terlihat peningkatan
profesionalisme analisis kebijakan dan pelembagaannya di pemerintahan.
Pada periode setelah Perang Dunia II, pendekatan analysentrik mulai
mendominasi analisis kebijakan.

Evolusi analisis
kebijakan umumnya telah mengikuti perubahan di dalam masyarakat. Salah
satu perubahan besar di dalam masyarakat adalah tumbuhnya wilayah perkotaan
di Mesopotamia dan kemudian di India, China dan Yunani. Pada periode
abad pertengahan, peradaban perkotaan menjadi lebih kompleks dengan
adanya diferensiasi dan spesialisasi peran analisis kebijakan terutama
masalah keuangan, perang dan hukum.

Transformasi
utama di dalam produksi pengetahuan kebijakan terjadi sebagai akibat
Revolusi Industri dan Jaman Pencerahan, keduanya diikuti pertumbuhan
stabilitas politik di antara kekacauan sosial. Pada abad dua puluh,
analisis kebijakan berkembang. Pertama untuk menanggapi kelesuan ekonomi
dan perang, dan kemudian sebagai reaksi terhadap pemerintah yang tumbuh
secara dramatis. Sesudah Perang Dunia II, lahir masyarakat pasca-industri
yang memiliki klas teknis-profesional yang terdidik dan telah mencapai
posisi menonjol yang tidak terduga seperti periode sebelumnya.

Terdapat sedikitnya
dua cara utama untuk menjelaskan evolusi sejarah analisis kebijakan
dari dulu hingga saat ini. Menurut salah satu pendekatan (bimbingan
teknokratis), pengetahuan kebijakan adalah sumber daya langka yang kepemilikannya
dapat meningkatkan kekuatan dan pengaruh analisis kebijakan yang profesional.
Pendekatan yang lain (konseling teknokratis) sebaliknya menyatakan bahwa
peran utama analis kebijakan adalah untuk mengesahkan keputusan kebijakan
yang dibuat oleh pemegang kekuasaan.


Masing-masing
pendekatan membantu di dalam beberapa hal untuk menjelaskan perubahan
sejarah, tetapi keduanya cenderung untuk melebih-lebihkan kekuasaan
dan pengaruh analisis kebijakan dengan alasan yang berbeda. Pendekatan
bimbingan teknokratis terlalu berlebihan menilai pengaruh analisis di
dalam membentuk pilihan kebijakan yang penting, sebaliknya pendekatan
konseling teknokratis salah dalam menilai kepentingan simbolis dari
analisis di dalam mengesahkan keputusan kebijakan yang dibuat pada dasar-dasar
politik.

Apapun keputusan
akhir dari kontroversi tersebut, adalah jelas bahwa lingkungan masyarakat
pada saat ini dan masalahnya telah berubah secara dramatis. Usaha-usaha
untuk mengembangkan prosedur yang baru dan lebih baik untuk menghasilkan
informasi yang akan memberi sumbangan kepada resolusi permasalahan publik
bukanlah semata-mata tugas intelektual ataupun tugas ilmiah, tetapi
pada dasarnya bersifat politis. Analisis kebijakan melekat di dalam
proses politik yang merefleksikan konflik nilai dari beberapa kelompok
masyarakat yang memperjuangkan visi mereka sendiri tentang pengembangan
sosial.

Sumber:

William N.
Dunn, Pengantar Analisis Kebijakan Publik, terjemahan.

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The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath A Political Economy Perspective (Part 2 of 3)

Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser
World Bank
1

Paper
Presented at the Conference:
CAN DECENTRALIZATION HELP REBUILD INDONESIA?

A
Conference Sponsored by the International Studies Program,
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies,
Georgia State University

May 1-3 2002

Atlanta,
Georgia


    2. Issues in Administrative
    Decentralization

Law 22 of 1999
devolves most functions of government to Indonesia’s regions—currently
30 provinces and over 348 districts and cities. The key exceptions (Art.
7) are national defense, international relations, justice, police, monetary,
development planning, religion, and finance. The districts must perform
important functions (Art.11), including health, education, environmental
and infrastructure services. The province as anautonomous region
has only a minor role, mainly in coordination, and backstopping districts
and cities that cannot yet perform their functions—which may be an
opening for an expanded provincial role. Law 22 explicitly states
that there is no hierarchical relationship between the province as an
autonomous region and the district. The province will also continue
to perform deconcentrated central tasks, and is the central government
representative in the regions. Implementing regulations (PP25/2000)
further specify the remaining roles of the central and provincial governments,
including setting standards for service delivery.

The regional
councils directly elect the head of region, although this election needs
confirmation by the President (Art. 40). The DPRD can dismiss
a head of region as well, but unlike the situation at the national level,
DPRD and head of regions are supposed to be partners of the regional
government (Art.16) after the collegial model as it exists for instance
in the Netherlands. The central government can annul regional
bylaws and regulations that conflict with national laws and regulations
(Art. 114), but the regions can appeal to the Supreme Court against
the center’s decision—at least according to the law. Urban areas
(Art. 92) are obliged to include community and private parties into
development planning. No such obligation exists for rural areas.
The intergovernmental regional autonomy advisory board with representatives
from the center and the regions is to advise the President on issues
concerning decentralization, and approves requests for new regions that
can be originated from the government of existing regions.

Whose function
is it anyway?


More than
one year into decentralization, much unclarity remains on what exactly
has been decentralized. Law 22 does not define local government
functions directly, but only by specifying what the center (Art.7) and
the province (Art 9) do. Article 11 specifies local government
obligatory functions, but not to a level of operational detail.
PP 25/2000 is not much help here, as it focuses on the remaining functions
of central and regional governments. This legal framework of “general
competency” rather than ultra vires definition of function as embedded
in Law 5/1974 is unusual for local governments. It is also more
radical than the subsidiarity principle—which was apparently the inspiration
of the drafting team.9 Subsidiarity as a principle
would not call for a limited list of central functions in the law, but
for a process by which decentralization or centralization is determined,
while specifying the principles that guide the process.

Omission of
a general clause in the law to state that local government is bound
by national law (omitted because the drafting team felt it was obvious10)
further obscured the exact extent and nature of decentralization.
This confusion was further increased by TAP MPR III which determined
the hierarchy of laws, but omitted the ministerial decree as a legal
instrument.11 Unfortunately, much of the detail on
government functions is contained in such ministerial decrees.
Moreover, even though regional regulations (PERDAs) are placed below
central government legal instruments such as government regulations
and Presidential Decrees, arguably organic regional regulations (i.e.
based directly on a law that delegates regulatory responsibility to
the regions) should take precedent over central regulations and decrees
without a direct basis in the law. Worse, some central agencies,
notably those for Land management and for Investment Approval have managed
to get a Presidential Decree issued which exempts their authorities
from decentralization as Law 22/99 calls for. And the adjustment
of sectoral laws to align them with regional autonomy, as is called
for in Law 22/99 Art. 133. Finally, the revised Art.18 of
the constitution now calls for central functions to be regulated by
Law, and the question is whether that law is Law 22/99, or whether a
separate law is called for to specify these functions.

The bottom
line of all this is that the distribution of functions, let alone the
expected performance in exercising the functions, is still far from
clear. Beyond causing utter confusion in the regions, this state
of play not only undermines accountability of the regional government,
but also hampers judgment on the vertical distribution of fiscal resources
(see below). The confusion has not stopped central government
to embark on an effort to have the regions “recognize” their functions
in a positive list that is to be cleared by Presidential Decree.12
Without deeper understanding and agreement on the functions themselves,
and the minimum standards for these functions, recognition of these
functions seems distracting at best.

One way forward
is currently under debate in Indonesia. First, international agreements
and sectoral laws could be screened on commitments on service delivery
standards already made. For instance, the Education Law guarantees
9 years of education for all. Second, central government and regions
could embark on a process that would establish agreed standards of services
in key areas, while taking into account the regions’ fiscal and human
resource capacity. Standards thus agreed could then become the
basis for monitoring and supervision, and possibly sanction. In
all likelihood, these standards will vary widely per region, given Indonesia’s
wide diversity in capacity. Meanwhile, a process to align sectoral
laws with Law 22/99 could start, and the revisions could further specify
the functions, and service standards, and which of those standards are
to be considered as binding and sanctionable under PP20/2001 Art.16.
Those sanctionable standards are likely to be few.


Levels of
Government, Size of Local Governments, and Economy of Scale

Law 22/99 assigns
most responsibility to the local government level. The provincial
level only has coordinating functions, a role in issues that surpass
district boundaries, or they can perform local government functions
for those unable to perform the functions. The Province has a
potential role in performing task on behalf of the districts, but little
initiative has been undertaken to exploit this possibility under the
law.13 The fact that the law explicitly states that
there is no hierarchical relation between the province and the local
governments did not help the province in gathering the local governments
to plan for joint operation of functions and facilities. As a
result, tasks with large externalities and significant economies of
scale such as watershed management, sea management, communicable disease
control, and others are likely to be left unperformed or underprovided.

Scale economies
are also at risk because of the size of local governments. This
is likely to get worse in the near future due to the apparently unstoppable
tendency to create new regions—both provinces and local governments.
The number of local governments since Law 22 passed has increased from
less than 300 to 348 in 2002, with over 20 new ones expected for 2003,
and the number of provinces increased from 26 to 32 (including the apparently
defunct new provinces on Irian Jaya). The regions already show
a wide variety in population size: provinces range from less than 800,000
inhabitants (Gorontalo) to over 35 million (East Java), and local governments
from 24,000 to 4.1 million. Creation of new regions—which requires
a law—is driven by several considerations, including historic and
ethnic ones. But the wish to create a new region is likely to
come from fiscal incentives as well. For one, if a district has
a significant amount of natural resource revenues it will be better
off to become a province, as it then no longer need to share the revenues
with surrounding districts, or with the originating province.
Urban areas are more likely to receive a share of the personal income
tax than rural areas, and they have an incentive to split off from the
kabupaten they are part off. And in the new DAU system, every
region gets a lump-sum amount, thus creating incentives for each region
to split up.

Creating more
and more regions is not without consequence. Information on the
wage bill of local government per capita of the population seems to
point at sharply decreasing efficiency at the level of about 500,000
people (Figure). The districts with less than 100,000 people have
about twice the wage bill per capita that those districts with 500,000
people have. Some of the difference could perhaps be explained
by geography or a negative correlation between population size and density—thereby
necessitating a larger civil service to supply the same amount of services.
But prima facie the suggested scale economies would argue for consolidation
of regions rather than the creation of new ones.




Governance
and Accountability

The potential
benefits of decentralization depend crucially on governance. By all
accounts, the jury on the link between decentralization and the prospects
for improved governance at the local level is still out, and14
several concerns about the prospects of decentralization/devolution
in developing countries.15 On the one hand government
closer to the people reduces monitoring costs of the electorate, and
competition among local governments could drive out corruption.
On the other, local governments seem to be more prone to elite capture.


The fall of
New Order regime in 1999 and the subsequent “Big Bang” decentralization
of 2001 promised to fundamentally change the locus of responsibility
and accountability for public service delivery in Indonesia. By
“bringing government closer to the people,” decentralization can
serve as a driving force towards generating improvements in Indonesia’s
notably poor governance environment. Symptomatic of this governance
environment is that Indonesia continues to be perceived as suffering
from one of the highest internationally levels of corruption.
This has proven corrosive to both public service delivery and the private-sector
environment.16

Numerous governance
issues have received public attention in Indonesia. These include
money politics (“politik uang”), centered especially on concerns
that local elections for regional heads have been increasingly bought.
Local political elites in executive and legislature has to the political
aspirations of the wider populations (“politik elit”). The
new local heads have increasingly started acting a little kings (“raja
kecil”) who are neither accountable to central authorities, or their
local constituencies. Meanwhile, rent-seeking has proliferated
in many regions due to the proliferation of these new actors and increased
the dangers of overgrazing (many hands of “campur tangan”).
17
This problem is accentuated by the belief on some parts of the executive
and legislative that their tenures are limited, and hence their access
to rents is limited as well.

To blame decentralization
per se for these weaknesses seems far fetched. Moreover, the weaknesses
in governance at the regional level should be considered relatively
to those taking place at the center. Whether these incidences
of weak governance are systematic remains to be seen. In part,
weak accountability of the head of region could be temporary: many heads
of regions have not yet been elected, but were appointed by the government
before local elections took place. The vaguely defined authorities and
functions of the regions undermines accountability as well, but these
are likely to become clearer over time. But other, more fundamental
causes seem at work as well. One issue is Indonesia’s strong
party system that limits the interest local councilors take in their
local constituents. Another is that Government Regulations on the accountability
of the head of region have strengthened the position of the head such
that it has become almost impossible for regional parliaments to fire
him. And finally, absence of formal accountability mechanisms
such as external audit of regional governments also undermines accountability.




References

1

The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper
are entirely those of the authors. They do not represent the views of
the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
This paper draws on the forthcoming World Bank Regional Public Expenditure
Review for Indonesia, and on Hofman, Kaiser and Kajatmiko (2001). The
authors wish to express thanks to Jorge Martinez, Roy Bahl, Richard
Bird, Roy Kelly, Dana Weist, Blane Lewis, Bernd May, and Machfud Sidik
for the many helpful discussions on the topic of the paper. We thank
Fitria Fitriani for excellent research assistance.

9
Gabe Ferazzi, (2002): Obligatory Functions and Minimum Standards: A
Preliminary Review of the Indonesian approach GTZ SfDM, Report No/2002-2,
March.

10
Conversation with Bernd May.

11
The then-Minister of Justice argued in a letter to all ministries that
the MPR decision constitutionally higher than a law) does not apply
as far as ministerial decrees are concerned.

12
The “positive list” approach came from an idea mentioned in an IMF
technical assistance report in the year 2000. The report argued
that no judgment on assignment of revenues could be made without a detailed
costing of expenditure assignments.


13
One exception familiar to the authors are the two Provincial Health
Projects financed by the World Bank. These projects create province-level
cooperative structures among he local governments to develop and implement
province-wide health policies.

14
Save for a brief federalist constitution in the wake of independence
from Holland in 1949, Indonesia’s prevailing constitution of 1945
is that of a unitary state.

15
See for example Crook and Sverrisson (1999) or Azfar et al. (2000;2001).

16
See for example O.B. Server (1996) and Partnership for Governance Reform
(2001)

17

In December 2001, the Head of the DPR’s budget commission, Benny Pasaribu,
created a stir when he claimed that 40 percent of the General Block
Allocation Grant (DAU), implicitly arguing that more control and oversight
from the center was needed (Jakarta Post 2001a). Arguably capacities
differ widely by islands. On islands like Java-Bali capacities
can generally be argued to be sufficient, which the situation more difficult
in Local Governments in some of the Outer Islands.

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Tanggung Jawab dan Beban Kerja di Satuan Kerja Pengelolaa Keuangan Daerah (SKPKD) Kabupaten Jombang

Satu-satunya
satuan kerja yang memiliki fungsi sebagai Satuan Kerja Pengelola Keuangan
Daerah (SKPKD) di Jombang adalah Dinas Pendapatan, Pengelolaan Keuangan
dan Aset Daerah (DPPKAD). Secara historis DPPKAD merupakan unit organisasi
hasil transformasi dari Badan Pengelola Keuangan Daerah (BPKD) yang
berasal dari peleburan tiga unit kerja yaitu Dinas Pendapatan, Bagian
Keuangan Setda dan Bagian Kas Daerah Setda.

Peleburan ini
merupakan tuntutan reformasi birokrasi di bidang pengelolaan keuangan
daerah yang diawali dengan terbitnya UU No. 17 Tahun 2003 tentang Keuangan
Negara yang kemudian disusul dengan beberapa paket regulasi keuangan
seperti UU No.1 Tahun 2004 tentang Perbendaharaan Negara, UU No. 33
Tahun 2004 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan Antara Pemerintah Pusat dan
Pemerintah Daerah, PP No. 24 Tahun 2005 tentang Standar Akuntansi Pemerintah,
Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 58 Tahun 2005 tentang Pengelolaan Keuangan
Daerah dan Permendagri No. 13 Tahun 2006 tentang Pedoman Pengelolaan
Keuangan Daerah yang kemudian dirubah dengan Permendagri No. 59 Tahun
2007 tentang Perubahan Permendagri No. 13 Tahun 2006 tentang Pengelolaan
Keuangan Daerah. Rangkaian perubahan regulasi tersebut merupakan tuntutan
masyarakat dan upaya sistematis pemerintah dalam menjalankan reformasi
birokrasi di bidang pengelolaan keuangan negara/daerah.

Paket regulasi
keuangan negara/daerah di atas, satu sisi memberi ”angin segar”
dalam upaya menciptakan good governance governmen yang telah
lama didambakan masyarakat. Namun, di sisi lain menuntut pengelola keuangan
daerah khususnya Satuan Kerja Pengelola Keuangan Daerah (SKPKD) bekerja
lebih hati-hati, jeli dan tidak boleh melakukan kesalahan mengingat
resiko pekerjaan yang terkait secara langsung pada sanksi hukum yang
relatif tidak ringan, sementara sistem pertanggung jawaban dan pelaporan
keuangan daerah memiliki sistem kerja dan pengawasan yang berlapis dan
membutuhkan alokasi tenaga dan waktu yang lebih besar.


Sebagai satu-satunya
Satuan Kerja Pengelola Keuangan Daerah (SKPKD), DPPKAD memiliki tanggung
jawab dan beban kerja yang tidak ringan. Selain menjalankan fungsi administrasi
internal yang dilaksanakan Tata Usaha, DPPKAD juga berfungsi sebagai
konsolidator di bidang Pendapatan, Anggaran, Bendahara Umum Daerah,
Aset dan Akuntansi serta pengelolaan gaji PNS yang juga dikelola Tata
Usaha. Sedangkan fungsi khusus lainnya yang memiliki beban dan resiko
pekerjaan relatif lebih berat adalah pengelolaan dana bantuan keuangan
dan dana hibah.

Dari perspektif
pengambilan keputusan, semua fungsi di atas membutuhkan pengambilan
keputusan yang lebih hati-hati, jeli, cepat, tepat dan cerdas dengan
memperhatikan sinergitas berbagai aspek tuntutan pelayanan, suasana
lingkungan politik dengan semua regulasi yang mengatur proses dan pertanggung-jawabannya.

Dalam menjalankan
fungsinya, DPPKAD memiliki aktivitas utama menjalankan kewajibannya
menyediakan layanan terkait dengan pengelolaan keuangan mulai dari perencanaan
anggaran daerah, transaksi penerimaan daerah, permintaan pencairan dana,
pengendalian aset dan pengelolaan gaji PNS dalam suatu sistem akuntansi
yang berakhir pada penyusunan laporan pertanggung jawaban. Semua aktivitas
utama tersebut menuntut penyelesaian dalam waktu yang singkat. Hal ini
tentu menguras energi dan waktu jam kerja efektif pada umumnya, mengingat
volume pekerjaan yang tidak sedikit dan perlu kejelian dalam penyelesaiannya
agar tidak terjadi kesalahan baik kesalahan administratif maupun kesalahan
berupa pelanggaran hukum atas peraturan yang berlaku.

Secara fakta
dalam aktivitasnya sehari-hari, setiap pegawai di DPPKAD dituntut memiliki
kesadaran tinggi atas penyelesaian tugasnya masing-masing. Karena jika
tidak, pekerjaan baru keesokan hari akan menambah beban yang lebih tinggi
mengingat kompleksitas masing-masing pekerjaan yang relatif rumit dan
membutuhkan keahlian khusus. Selain itu, penundaan pekerjaan memiliki
dampak yang lebih luas dari sekedar beban kerja, yaitu berupa penghambatan
jalannya ”roda” pemerintahan dan pembangunan daerah.

Hal ini yang
menyebabkan sering terlihat banyak pegawai di DPPKAD menyelesaikan tugasnya
hingga larut malam bahkan tidak jarang sampai dini hari dan sering pula
penyelesaian tugas tersebut dilaksanakan pada hari libur kerja.

Selain hal
tersebut, selaku konsolidator, DPPKAD memiliki kewajiban melaksanakan
konsolidasi tugas yang terkait dengan pengelolaan keuangan daerah dengan
semua Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah (SKPD) dan Badan Usaha Milik Daerah
(BUMD) yang ada di Kabupaten Jombang. Aktivitas konsolidasi ini, sering
dilakukan berminggu-minggu tanpa putus baik pada saat jam kerja efektif
maupun di luar jam kerja efektif.

Hal ini terjadi,
khususnya pada saat Penyusunan APBD, Penyusunan Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah
Daerah (LKPD), pelayanan PBB terbuka untuk masyarakat (bulan panutan),
sensus barang milik daerah, permintaan pencairan dana menjelang hari
raya idul fitri dan akhir tahun atau pada saat terjadi perubahan/kenaikan
gaji PNS secara nasional. Hal serupa juga terjadi pada saat BPK melakukan
auditing LKPD yang mengharuskan semua pegawai di DPPKAD siap setiap
saat dalam melayani permintaan auditor BPK untuk menyiapkan dokumen-dokumen
pertanggung-jawaban yang hendak di audit.

Di luar itu,
pencairan dana bantuan keuangan dan/atau dana hibah juga cukup menyita
waktu dan energi. Petugas yang terlibat diharuskan memiliki kesabaran
lebih tinggi mengingat pada umumnya penerima bantuan keuangan adalah
masyarakat umum dalam jumlah yang besar dan notabene memiliki
keterbatasan pengetahuan tentang syarat administratif yang dibutuhkan,
sehingga petugas harus meluangkan lebih banyak waktu untuk menjelaskan
secara persuasif persyaratannya. Meskipun persyaratan tersebut sudah
dicantumkan atau telah diinformasikan pada saat pengajuan proposal.


Terkait dengan
diterbitkannya UU No. 8 Tahun 2008 tentang Pajak Daerah yang mengamanatkan
penyerahan beberapa urusan pajak kepada daerah kabupaten/kota diperlukan
berbagai persiapan dan memiliki implikasi pada penambahan potensi beban
kerja yang lebih besar. Potensi beban kerja yang dapat diidentifikasi
secara dini adalah pekerjaan analisis pajak, pendataan, penerbitan dokumen
dan proses penerimaan daerah. Hal tersebut tentu saja membutuhkan keahlian
khusus dan persiapan yang matang sehingga penerimaan pajak daerah bisa
meningkat, baik secara agregat maupun secara rasio namun tidak menghambat
laju pertumbuhan ekonomi daerah.

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Sistem Keseimbangan Reward dan Punishment untuk Reformasi Birokrasi

Kesan atas buruknya pelayanan
instansi pemerintah merupakan tantangan berat yang harus dihadapai dalam
proses reformasi birokrasi. Beberapa kesan yang berhasil ditemu-kenali
telah memberikan gambaran umum pelayanan publik yang secara bertahap
tetapi pasti harus dibenahi.

Dalam beberapa kasus,
layanan yang diberikan terkesan terlalu birokratis, tidak transparan,
terlalu panjang dan dirasakan seringkali berbelit-belit. Hal ini juga
diperburuk oleh kurangnya spirit pelayanan prima oleh aparat
penyedia layanan. Spirit bahwa birokrasi berkewajiban melayani
masyarakat dan tidak untuk dilayani belum melekat pada budaya kerja
aparatur.


Selain itu, layanan yang
diberikan kurang didukung oleh aparat yang kompeten dan profesional.
Keluhan tidak profesionalnya pelayanan publik yang muncul dari masyarakat
seringkali diperburuk oleh rendahnya kompetensi aparat. Kondisi ini
pada giliranya akan berpengaruh kepada kinerja pelayanan kepada publik
secara keseluruhan.

Pada beberapa jenis layanan
publik masih ditemukan adanya praktek korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme
(KKN). Kondisi ini umumnya terjadi karena adanya beberapa situasi yang
saling mempengaruhi satu dengan lainnya.

Di satu sisi, kondisi
aparat dengan tingkat penghasilan yang relatif rendah terperangkap dalam
mental dan perilaku korup. Di sisi yang lain, masyarakat pengguna layanan
juga belum memiliki spirit untuk mendahulukan yang lebih berhak,
dan belum sepenuhnya mau melaksanakan semua kewajibannya secara benar.
Sebagian masyarakat bahkan menempuh jalan pintas untuk memperoleh berbagai
fasilitas pelayanan yang menguntungkan diri sendiri, meski akibatnya
akan berdampak buruk terhadap kinerja pelayanan publik secara keseluruhan.
Untuk itu, upaya pemberantas KKN tanpa pandang bulu diharapkan akan
mendorong komitmen berbagai pihak untuk secara bersama-sama menghilangkan
kebiasaan buruk tersebut.

Sehubungan dengan hal
tersebut, berbagai langkah kongkrit seharusnya dilaksanakan dengan mengkaitkan
secara langsung antara kinerja layanan, kompetensi aparat, tanggung
jawab dan resiko pekerjaan dengan kesejahteraan pegawai sebagai langkah
positif untuk meningkatkan pelayanan kepada masyarakat.

Untuk dapat memberikan
pelayanan terbaik ada tiga hal yang harus dibenahi, yaitu: Pertama,
organisasi
harus diatur dan disusun berdasarkan fungsi untuk menghasilkan

output
dan outcome yang sesuai dengan pelayanan yang diharapkan
masyarakat/pelanggan. Kedua, proses bisnis juga harus
dibenahi agar tidak saja akuntabel dan transparan, tetapi juga ringkas,
singkat dan murah. Ketiga, untuk menjalankan itu semua dibutuhkan
SDM
yang kompeten serta bekerja secara terukur dan disiplin.


Program pembenahan tiga
hal di atas dapat dijalankan apabila sistem reward
dan punishment dijalankan secara seimbang. Keuntungan dari penerapan
sistem reward dan punishment yang seimbang adalah: menurunnya
peluang korupsi; budaya kerja semakin baik; dan keluhan masyarakat/pelanggan
menurun. Keuntungan lain dari penerapan sistem reward
dan punishment yang seimbang adalah terbentuknya sinergitas antara
kinerja, integritas serta disiplin pegawai.


Secara umum hubungan
antara penerapan sistem reward
dan punishment yang seimbang dengan terbentuknya sinergitas antara
kinerja, integritas serta disiplin pegawai adalah:


  1. Setiap pegawai dituntut menghasilkan
    kinerja yang sesuai dengan tuntutan pekerjaan dan organisasi

  2. Memiliki integritas yang sesuai
    dengan tuntutan organisasi dan masyarakat

  3. Disiplin dalam melaksanakan
    tugas dan menaati jam kerja


  4. Setiap pelanggaran kinerja,
    integritas dan disiplin, diancam dengan sanksi pemotongan rewards
    yang menjadi hak pegawai yang bersangkutan



Keseimbangan reward
dan punishment paling tidak membutuhkan empat syarat, yaitu:

Pertama
, dilakukan dengan cara diskriminasi dengan penerapan
job grading
(pemeringkatan kerja). Kedua, analisis beban
kerja. Ketiga, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).
Ke-empat
, assessment centre (pusat penilaian). Sementara
pelaksanaannya dapat dilakukan secara bertahap, dengan memilih salah
satu satuan kerja sebagai pilot project.


Di dalam sistem birokrasi
publik di negara-negara yang relatif bersih, kita selalu bisa menyaksikan
bahwa prinsip reward dan punishment yang seimbang benar-benar
ditegakkan. Kita bisa perhatikan bagaimana mekanisme ini berjalan di
Singapura, sebuah negara kecil yang relatif berhasil mengendalikan korupsi
dalam bentuk suap.

Ketika seorang pengemudi
mobil di Singapura melakukan pelanggaran karena parkir tidak pada tempatnya
dan tertangkap basah oleh seorang petugas polisi, sistem reward and
punishment
langsung berjalan. Seandainya pengemudi mobil akan menyuap
polisi, dia harus berhitung apakah polisi tersebut bisa disuap dan tidak
melaporkan niat menyuap tersebut kepada pejabat kepolisian yang lebih
tinggi. Jika setelah terjadi suap, polisi itu melaporkan kasusnya, justru
penyuap akan mendapat denda lebih berat dan polisi tadi akan mendapat
imbalan, misalnya dalam bentuk credit point untuk kenaikan pangkatnya.

Hal yang sama terjadi
dari pihak si polisi, seandainya dia ingin menerima suap, dia harus
memastikan bahwa pengemudi mobil itu tidak akan melaporkan dirinya ke
divisi Internal Affairs di kepolisian. Jika ternyata pengemudi
mobil melaporkan polisi tersebut, dia akan mendapatkan keringanan denda
sedangkan petugas polisi tadi akan mendapatkan catatan kondite buruk,
mungkin bisa diturunkan pangkatnya.

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Pembangunan Partisipatif

1. Pengertian pembangunan partisipatif secara konsep dan prinsipnya
Pembangunan partisipatif yaitu pembangunan yang memposisikan masyarakat sebagai subyek atas program pembangunan yang diperuntukkan bagi kepentingan mereka sendiri. Pelibatan masyarakat mulai dari tahap perencanaan-pelaksanaan-monitoring-evaluasi. Pengerahan massa (mobilisasi) diperlukan jika program berupa padat karya
Prinsip – prinsip pembangunan partisipatif:
• Perencanaan program harus berdasarkan fakta
• Program harus memperhitungkan kemampuan masyarakat dari segi teknik, ekonomi dan sosialnya
• Program harus memperhatikan unsur kepentingan kelompok dalam masyarakat
• Partisipasi masyarakat dalam pelaksanaan program
• Pelibatan sejauh mungkin organisasi-organisasi yang ada
• Program hendaknya memuat program jangka pendek dan jangka panjang
• Memberi kemudahan untuk evaluasi
• Program harus memperhitungkan kondisi, uang, waktu, alat dan tenaga (KUWAT) yang tersedia.

2. Metode pendekatan sosial dalam pembangunan partisipatif dan strategi yang digunakan
Metode pendekatan sosial: Serangkaian prosedur dan teknik yang ditempuh guna menyampaikan suatu ide atau gagasan agar dapat diterima oleh pihak sasaran. Unsur-unsur yang terkandung:
• Ada ide atau gagasan tertentu yang ingin disampaikan
• Ada pihak penyampai dan pihak sasaran penerima
• Secara implisit pihak penyampai ide menginginkan sukses didalam menyampaikan ide atau gagasan
• Di pihak sasaran penerima, terdapat banyak faktor yang ikut menentukan sikap menerima atau menolak terhadap ide atau gagasan yang disampaikan
Macam-macam metode pendekatan sosial:
• Metode pendekatan sosial mentalistik: Titikberat pada perubahan sikap mental sasaran seperti penerangan, penyuluhan, pelatihan, dll (bersedia membuat MCK, Pos Kamling)
• Metode pendekatan sosial kondisional: Titikberat pada penanggulangan/perbaikan lingkungan fisik seperti percontohan MCK, Pos Kamling, dll (tergerak untuk meniru)
Penerapan Metode Pendekatan Sosial
• Jangka pendek: Pendekatan sosial kondisional perlu dibarengi dengan melalui pendekatan otoritatif, artinya: ide atau gagasan yang ingin disampaikan harus mendapat legitimasi dari orang yang memiliki otoritas yaitu pejabat setempat. Contoh: program pelajaran bahasa Inggris/matematika utk SD.
• Jangka panjang: pendekatan sosial mentalistik perlu dibarengi dengan melalui pendekatan persuasif, artinya : ide atau gagasan harus disampaikan secara rutin melalui berbagai media dan kesempatan. Contoh: program penghijauan dan pemanfaatan pekarangan rumah untuk tanaman obat keluarga.

3. Strategi Penerapan Metode Pendekatan Sosial
• Kenali dan pahami karakteristik kelompok sasaran sebaik mungkin (anak-anak, remaja/karang taruna, dewasa, orang tua, lansia)
1. Kejelasan program (tujuan dan hasil yang diharapkan)
2. Setting waktu
3. Lokasi pelaksanaan
4. Lama pelaksanaan
5. Materi program
• Melibatkan kelompok sasaran dalam seluruh rangkaian kegiatan
1. Proses penemuan masalah dan melihat masalah
2. Proses penentuan prioritas
3. Proses pengambilan kebijaksanaan
4. Proses pelaksanaan
5. Proses menilai perkembangan
3. Jelaskan siklus perencanaan pembangunan daerah!
• Persiapan perencanaan
• Pengumpulan dan analisis data
• Penentuan hasil yang diharapkan (visi pembangunan total)
• Penentuan strategi pembangunan daerah
• Penentuan sasaran-sasaran pada setiap sector pembangunan
• Penentuan strategi pelaksanaan
• Penentuan tahapan-tahapan pembangunan dan hasil yang ingin dicapai
• Penentuan kegiatan-kegiatan yang akan dilaksanakan
• Penyusunan rencana pembangunan daerah
• Penetapan rencana pembangunan daerah dalam perda menjadi program pembangunan daerah(propeda) dan penjabaran untuk pelaksanaannya

4. Konsep dan tujuan musrenbang desa dan kelurahan
Musrenbang yaitu forum musyawarah tahunan para pemangku kepentingan desa / kelurahan untuk menyepakati rencana kegiatan untuk tahun anggaran berikutnya. Diselenggarakan oleh lembaga publik, yaitu pemerintah desa / kelurahan bekerjasama dengan warga / masyarakat dan para pemangku kepentingan (swasta)
Kerangka hukum musrenbang:
a. UU no. 32 tahun 2004 tentang pemerintah daerah
b. PP no. 72 tahun 2005 tentang desa
c. PP no. 73 tahun 2005 tentang kelurahan
Payung hukum untuk pelaksanaan musrenbang: UU no. 25 tahun 2004 tentang system perencanaan pembangunan nasional
Musrenbang bersifat partisipatif dan dialogis. Jadi, inti dari musrenbang adalah partisipasi aktif warga. Yang dibicarakan dalam musrenbang adalah isu / persoalan, kebijakan, peraturan, atau program pembangunan.
Tujuan Musrenbang Desa:
• Menyepakati prioritas kebutuhan dan kegiatan desa yang akan menjadi bahan penyusunan RKPD dengan pemilahan
a. Kegiatan desa yang akan dilaksanakan sendiri dan dibiayai oleh swadaya desa / masyarakat
b. Kegiatan desa yang akan dilaksanakan dikoordinasikan oleh lembaga kemasyarakatan
c. Kegiatan desa yang diusulkan melalui musrenbang kecamatan yang akan dibiayai oleh APBD kabupaten atau APBD provinsi
• Menyepakati tim delegasi desa yang akan memaparkan persoalan desa pada musrenbang kecamatan untuk penyusunan program pemda / SKPD tahun berikutnya.
• Keluaran Musrenbang desa
a. Daftar prioritas kegiatan untuk menyusun RKPD untuk tahun anggaran berjalan
b. Daftar nama tim delegasi desa yang akan mengikuti musrenbang kecamatan
c. Berita acara musrenbang desa
Tujuan Musrenbang Kelurahan
• Menyepakati prioritas kebutuhan dan kegiatan kelurahan yang menjadi bahan penyusunan rencana kerja SKPD kelurahan
• Kegiatan yang akan dilaksanakan ooleh warga melalui dana swadaya masyarakat dan dikoordinasikan oleh lembaga kemasyarakatan.
• Kegiatan yang dilaksanakan oleh kelurahan sendiri dibiayai dana bantuan dari pemda (kota)
• Kegiatan pembangunan yang diusulkan melalui musrenbang kecamatan dan dibiayai oleh APBD kota atau APBD provinsi
• Menyepakati tim delegasi kelurahan yang akan memaparkan persoalan kelurahan di musrenbang kecamatan untuk penyusunan program Pemda / SKPD tahun berikutnya
• Keluaran Musrenbang Kelurahan
a. Daftar prioritas kegiatan urusan pembangunan untuk menyusun Renja SKPD kelurahan
b. Daftar prioritas kegiatan pembangunan yang akan dilaksanakan secara swadaya
c. Daftar permasalahan yang akan diajukan ke musrenbang kecamatan
d. Daftar nama tim delegasi kelurahan
e. Berita acara

5. Menurut anda apakah musrenbang yang dilakukan di tingkat desa dan kelurahan sudah merupakan sebuah metode yang baik dalam memproses terakomodirnya keinginan masyarakat dalam pembangunan?
Sistem yang sudah ada harus diperbaiki kalau memang alasan jujur untuk kemajuan pembangunan ekonomi masyarakat di daerah-daerah tertinggal dan membenahi daerah-daerah hasil pemekaran yang dinilai belum ada perubahan yang signifikan, khususnya pembangunan bidang ekonomi dan infrastruktur dasar seperti jalan raya yang terkait erat dengan aktivitas masyarakat.

Dalam konteks pembangunan ekonomi dan pembangunan fisik/infrastruktur dasar tersebut, terutama di pedesaan, partisipasi masyarakat sangat penting, tidak sebatas pada tataran pelaksanaan di lapangan, tetapi mereka harus dilibatkan mulai dari awal perencanaan hingga pelaksanaan pembangunan di lapangan.

Pada tataran perencanaan, salah satu media yang paling cocok untuk mengakomodir partisipasi masyarakat, yaitu melalui musyawarah rencana pembangunan (Musrenbang) desa/kelurahan.

Musrenbang desa/kelurahan selama ini sudah berjalan, walaupun hasil dari Musrenbang desa dan kelurahan itu tidak banyak diakomodir oleh pengambil kebijakan dalam hal ini satuan kerja perangkat daerah (SKPD) sebagai pemilik proyek. Akibatnya, ada banyak masalah di desa seperti persoalan air bersih, sarana dan prasarana jalan yang sangat dibutuhkan oleh masyarakat, tidak dibangun karena pengambil kebijakan hanya mampu menyerap sekitar 10 persen dari hasil Musrenbang desa/kelurahan.

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